This Apothecary by Justin case study covers January to August 2026. Justin sells handmade soy candles online. He came to us after three agencies, convinced his ads were broken. The month he signed, he spent $3,204 on ads and made $548 back.
- 0.17× → 2.61× blended MER, January to August 2026, last complete month
- $69 → $137 average order value over the same period
- $400 → $52 cost to acquire a customer
- 1.20× break-even on the August margin
The starting position and the question we investigated
In January 2026 the store took eight orders from $3,204 of media. The average order was $69. After product costs, each customer was worth about $55 in gross profit, and each one cost about $400 to buy. Every order lost roughly $350 before anyone was paid.
The obvious question was how to make the ads cheaper. The question we investigated instead was whether any price existed at which this store could buy a customer and make money. At a $69 order and a $55 margin, the answer was no. Traffic in this category does not cost $55 a customer, and no amount of creative testing closes a gap of about seven times between what a customer cost and what a customer was worth.
The ads were never the problem. The offer could not pay for the customers it needed.
That finding changed the order of work. Fixing the campaigns first would have made the loss arrive faster. The first job was to change what a customer was worth.
The changes, and the order we made them in
- 1
Raise what a customer is worth: average order $69 to $137
Doubling the average order doubled what the store could afford to pay for a customer, from about $55 to about $115. The target stopped being a cost per customer under $55, which was impossible, and became under $115, which is ordinary.
- 2
Lift the margin: 80.1% to 83.7%
A small-looking change that did real work. It moved break-even from 1.25× to 1.20× and added gross profit to every order without adding any acquisition cost.
- 3
Only then, scale the media into the fix
Spend was not cut. It went from $3,204 in January to $10,525 in August. A $137 offer with real margin behind it can afford to bid for customers and converts better than a $69 one, so the cost per customer fell as spend rose.
Cost per customer fell from $400 to $52. We did not find cheaper traffic. The offer changed, so the same traffic became worth buying. If you want the reasoning behind this sequence in general terms, it is set out in how to improve profit without chasing more orders and what a good ROAS is for your business.
Results on one consistent basis
Every figure below compares January 2026 with August 2026, the last complete month at the time of writing. Definitions matter here, so each one is stated.
| Measure | January 2026 | August 2026 | Definition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Media spend | $3,204 | $10,525 | Paid media for the month |
| Blended MER | 0.17× | 2.61× | Store revenue divided by media spend |
| Average order | $69 | $137 | Revenue divided by orders |
| Gross margin | 80.1% | 83.7% | After product cost (Shopify cost of goods) |
| Break-even | 1.25× | 1.20× | The MER at which gross profit covers media |
| Cost per customer | $400 | $52 | Media divided by new customers |
| Profit per order | −$350 | +$49 | Gross profit less media, per order |
Justin describes the result on camera as "15x in revenue". That figure is the lift in blended MER from 0.17× to 2.61×, not a fifteen-fold rise in revenue on the same spend. We would rather state that plainly than let the headline do more work than it should.
Time, investment, limitations and the founder's view
It took about seven months and about $20,000 of capital, all up, to get there. We told him that before he started.
On Shopify cost of goods, media and our monthly fee, his running position bottomed near −$9,500 in March and crossed into the black in August, month seven. His own books show a deeper low, −$21,873 at month six, because they also carry labour, packaging, freight and transaction fees. Two cost bases, the same shape: months of falling cash, then the first profitable month. The general pattern is covered in why it gets worse before it gets better.
What this case can and cannot tell you
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It is one store.
A different product, margin or category would produce different numbers. It is not a forecast for your business.
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It covers eight months.
August is the last complete month in this record. It shows a turnaround, not a long-run average.
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The profit measure is first-order.
Profit per order here is gross profit less media. It does not include his labour, packaging, freight or transaction fees, which is why his own books show a deeper low.
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The capital figure is approximate.
"About $20,000" is the capital needed all up to reach the first profitable month, on the cost bases described above.
In his words
"The first engagement with a full service company that actually listens to what my needs are, and what my philosophy is." Justin Binko, in a Google review published under his own name.
The full client results page, including his video, is on our client results. The investigation that found the problem is the same one every engagement starts with: the Validation Sprint. If your own numbers look like his January, how we approach ecommerce strategy and conversion work that starts with the cause explain what we would look at first.
You are on the list. The next one lands on Friday.
About the author
Mareike NiedermeierMareike Niedermeier is the founder and CEO of Sales Savvy Online and the creator of Survivable Distance, a theory of ecommerce viability. Since 2019 her team has worked with more than 200 ecommerce brands. The Australian Business Journal named her a Top Ten Marketer in Australia.
More about Mareike →